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PREFACE
The work described in this report was performed by Teledyne McCormick
Selph (TMc/S) at our facility at Hollister, California for NASA-
MSFC under contract NAS8--31973 between .iune 1976 and May 1978,
-iv-
This' document is a combined qualification tei3t and final report
of a program to design, develop, and qualify a Safety and Arming
Device for the space shuttle Solid Rocket Booster. it is submitted
as
,
 documentation item Number 13 of Table VII of MSFC Specification
IOA00465 Revision C and the "Final Report" as described under
Reports:Requirements in Scope of Work, Exhibit "A." to Contract
NAS B 11;.73 -. It is presented in two volumes. 'Volume 1 consists
of the narrative program description (Section 1) and qualification
testing laboratory report (Section, 11). Volume 11 contains copies
of the following documents which were submitted to and approved by
MSFC: at. the required time throughout the program:
Development Test Report - Number 4918 .2 Rev. B
Lot Acceptance Test Report -- Number 4918-246 Rev..A
aevelopmLnt Test Procedure -- Number DTP 816780 Rev. A
Lot Acceptance Test Procedure - Number ATP 816780 Rev. B
Qualification Test Procedure - Number QTP $16780 Rev. A.
s
2 . C	 SCOPE`
The subject program was
 
conducted  'in five phases identified as:
Pf^ase- 	 aterial Stud and Protot a Desi^ 	 Y	 YP	 n9
1.1 Prototype Fabrication, Development Testing, and
FinAl Design
f	 121. Fabrication
IV Lot Acceptance Test
V Qualification
This comprehensive report is concerned with all aspects of the
programm from prototype design to qualification. Phases I through
IV of the program were thoroughly covered in earlier reports
which are included for reference as volume II of this report.
However, these phases will be reviewed and the most pertinent
facts discussed herein.
Therefore this report emphasizes the qualification phase of the
program not previously reported. Areas discussed include:
- description of tests and results
- test malfunctions, their cause and corrective action
w configuration
- test data sheets (section II)
-2-
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03. l	 DESIGN
The basic design for this Safety and Arming (S & A) Device was
a similar . device assembled by TMc/S and used on the SATURN Program.
Several modifications were made to the earlier design to make
it compatible with the more severe requirements of the Space
Shuttle SRB application. These included-.
modification of the body to enable it to withstand
the high output of the NS1 detonators without frag-
menting or allowing the detonators to be ejected.
Redesign of the explosive transfer charge to minimize
charge weight.
Redesign of the switch actuator to minimize component
macs and make the device less susceptabl.e to autorota-
tion of the rotor during dynamic environments.
The. validity of these modifications has been shown by the absence
of these failure modes during development and qualification testing.
3.2	 DEVELOPMENT
During the development phase of the program special test hardware
and full. scale S & A devices were assembled and tests performed
which emphasized structural integrity of the body and rotor,
explosive charge performance margins, and full scale S & A device
performance after dynamic testing. A comprehensive development
report Document Number 4918-2 was submitted and approved at the
p
i
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3.2	 DEVELOPMENT (Continued)
completion of the development phase. It is included in Volume
II of this report. However, the salient points will be reviewed
herein and the configurations, tests, and results summarized
in Table I.
3.2.1
	 Structural Integrity Tests'
This. test was performed on two units to demonstrate that the
S & A body could withstand the explosive output of two NISI det-
onators fired simultaneously without fragmentin g or expelling
the detonators. The test hardware was an S & A body containing
the sealing sleeve, a rotor with explosive transfer charges in-
stalled, and PN 10A00487 Debris Shield installer. Rotors were
placed in the SAFE position and both detonators fired simultan-
eously.
There was no fragmentation of the body and the detonators remained
in place.
0
3.2.2	 Explosive Charge Performance Margin Tests
Forty-five (45) pieces were fired in six groups. The test hard-
ware consisted of single port bodies, sealing sleeves, and rotors
with explosive charges installed. MSFC furnished NSI detonators.
and CDP lines were utilized. Parameters tested were gaps at
explosive interfaces, transfer charge over and under load, low
temperature, and angular misalignment of the rotor.
All test groups wer.; successful in Meeting the desired performance
limits. Data analysis indicated a very wide margin of reliable
performance with regard to ,rotor misalignment, 99.9% reliability
at 25°.
NQ.TEST DESCRIFTICN TESTS HARDWXM DESCRIPTION TEST PA	 TX;t MSVLTS
Structural intag- 2 Body with alanve, rotor Strength of body Bodies and rotorai
city Tdat with explosiva leads, with high output intact, diton$eors
HSI . detouators, CDF N8i detchators not ejmot4d
lines ^irsd ,
Explosive Train "_wet body with sleeve,
Vests rotor Vith explaaive
lead !1), NSI detonator,CDr Una
Group
	 I 5 Control group - Detonation Xferred,
nominal eonfig. CAF lines initiated,
cures consumed
Group
	
II 5 . 060 detonator Explosive lands
standoff, -650F initiated, CDR lines
initiated, cores oon-
Sumed
Group III 5 Worst case explo- Explosive leads wnitiat
sive lead to CDP ed, CAF lines intiated
end tip Standoff high order
was .060
Group IV 5 Explosive lead CDF leads initiated
303 underload high order
Group V 5 d
10S overload
leads
	 nnifr^ag-
me ntation of body cr
rotor
Group VI 20 Angular misalign- reliability of firing
ment. of rotor to is 99.99 at 953 Crbody for 22.65 0• nisalEign-
nent, *obikbility
Of not it_ in
39.99 *6 9Bt Cr for
misaligraA t of 48.3*
or 414P x4faty margin
in SAM pdmition
Full scale M
Tanta Complete e&A to operational testa
expected quel and San, and AM
configuration firing with basic
environmentn3. con-ditioring
Group	 I 2 Low temperature CUP linen initiated
function AIMD high order, witness
tubes fragwented
Group ' II 2 High temperature 23e decomposition of
function S M CDF teak leads, body
and rotor intact,
detonators : not expelled
t
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TABU I
	
c.
	3.2.3	 Full Scale S & A Tests
Four (4) complete S & A devices were asE . embled. They were sub-
jected to the non-destructive acceptancE tests, sine and random
vibration and the complete shock spectrum. Two devices were
fired at low temperature ARMED and two at high temperature SAFE.
These test units were completely successful with respect to
firing in the SAFE and the ARMED positions. The ARMED firings
caused high order propagation of the CDC' lines as evidenced by
fragmentation of the witness tubes. For the SAFE firings the
CDF test leads were not initiated, the holy and rotor remained
intact, and the detonators were not ejected. The 10AD0487 Debris
Retainers remained in place on the SAFE position firings with
no indication of separation.
	
3.2.4	 Problems and Corrective Actions
During assembly and test of the full scale development units
deficiencies arose with regard to:
(a) Failure of the monitor switches to actuate within 7.50
of rotor rotation.
(b) Overtravel of the rotor (beyond 900) at 12 vdc
(c) Leakage at the housing to body interface.
These deficiencies were found to be related to improper fit of
components or inadequate assembly and adjustmeiit instructions.
The corrective actions were to:
(d) Adjust switch position to achieve the 7.5 0 actuation
and add 100% Q.C. verification.
(e) Modify the decent to increase travel to prevent over-
rotation at 32 vdc.
(f) Modify housing and body dimensions to obtain closer
fit,
,1 Q
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3.2.4
	
Problems and Corrective Actions (Continued)
These corrective actions were subsequently incorporated into
the qualification lot of S&A devices and appear to have been
completely effective in preventing re--occurance of the deficiencies
experienced on the development units. The design was approved
for phase III fabrication of the qualification lot.
-7-
0
0
4.0
	
FABRICATION AND LOT ACCEPTANCE TEST
4.1
	
FABRICATION
O	 The next phase of the program was to fabricate a lot of sixteenp	 P g	
(16) S&A devices, fourteen (14) live units for qualification
testing, and two (2) inert units for delivery to MSFC.
The fabrication sequence was completed without major incidents.
However, deficiencies which appeared later during acceptance
testing were found to be related to marginally acceptable adjust-
ments made during assembly.
4.2	 LOT ACCEPTANCE TEST
During acceptance testing the examination of product, x-ray,
n-ray, vibration, and leak tests were completed without incident.
However during electrical cycling tests six (6) of sixteen (16)
units failed to actuate properly when 24 vdc was applied with
the units conditioned to +165 0F. This combination was the worst
case condition of solenoid torque available to actuate the device;
lowest input voltage and highest solenoid winding resistance
due to temperature effect. Under these conditions solenoid tor-
que was not sufficient to achieve reliable operation.
t	 The defective devices were disassembled, various inspections
and tests were performed, and assembly procedures were reviewed.
The conclusion was that the most probable cause of the malfunc-
tions was:
1.	 The .return spring force of the solenoids was greater
than allowed by the drawing. The net effect was
to reduce the torque output of the solenoids. Spring
force was not measured by TMc/S when the solenoids
were received allowing deficient parts into the produc-
tion area.
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2,	 Dur ing initial assn ibly the S & A doviceF were tested
for operation down to 24 vde at room temperature with
no allowance made for dacreased perfornrance due to
temperature Qtfects, fiowevor resistance measurements
showed an 18% increase in resistance of the solenoid
windings at 4 . 165®P which would have hA a corresponding
reduction in t~or:grre.
Solenoid return springs were reset to the correct value and
a resulting torque increasr was conf.,.rmed.	 The S & A devices
wer e r eassembled, ad^ustod, and oper at ion verified at +1650P
and 4.20 P (the operating temperature extremes) before the units
were resealed.	 The complete acceptance test sequence was re-
peated including acceptance vibration.	 Thaso reworked units
met all test requirements and operated proparly at the voltage
- and temperature extremes.
One lather: defoctive unit;,	 Specimen Numbor,% 13, was found after:
acceptance vibration,	 This unit actuated properly at all volt-
age levels but no reading was from the voltage monitor circuit.
Circuitry chocks indicated and subsequent disassembly confirmed
an open circuit due to a broken load wire. 	 The wire, broken
at pin 'IN" of the connector appears to have peon caused by a
combination of insufficient wire length and improper routing
ot,	 the wire	 bus, 	'.e.
i
The broken leadwire from pin 1°N" of the connector to terminal
' 11 24" was slightly shorn compared to the remaining mires. in
addition the wire bundle was .routed improperly whon the housing
was installed. This caused excessive stress to be applied
to all the solder~ connections particularly to pin "N S0 of the
connector. Re-eraminati®n of the N-Ray film confirmed these
conditions had existed but ware overlooked when N-Ray films
were examined.
.r
4 42 	 LOT ACCEPTANCE TEST (Continued)
The loose wore Was resolderec]l and the device re-assembled with
Particular 'attekztion paid to routing at the wire bundle to pre-
vent stressing the wire connections. This unit passed all re-
examination and repeat of the acceptance test program without
further problem. A correction to the wiring instruction in the
job history file (TMc/S supplementary records maintained in work
area) Will provide additional slack on this particular wire on
all further anits and N--Ray examination will verify proper rout-
ing of the wire bundle.
Acceptance testing.was therefore complete and the lot ready for
E
qualification testing.. A summary of acceptance tests results
are presented in Table II and the lot acceptance laboratory test
report is included in Volume 11 of this report.
9
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1	 (1) 0007 x x x x x X x No test anomaliex
2 (1) 0015 x x x x X x x No test anomalies
3 OOD5 x x x x x O e Failed to actuate properly at
24 Vdc @ +165°F
Unit X x x x x x x All tests acceptable after rwork
Reworked
4 0006 x x x x x x x No test anoraliee
5 0008 x x x x x x X No test anomalies
'6 0009 x x x x x 0 Failed to actuate propa:ly at
24 Vdc 9 }l6S°F
unit x x X X 3 x x All tests accapkab2a after rework
Reworked
7 0010 X x k x x x x No test anomalies
8 0011 x x x x x 0 Failed to acttato peoparly at
24 Vdc 0 IGSIF
unit x x x x x x x All teats accaptable after rwwork
Reworked
9 0012 x x x x x x X No test at»aliea
10 0013 x x x x x 0
M	
properly at
ed165
gactuate
24 Vdc
(2) gxceaded 3.0 amparea at 32 Vds
0 +200x'
unit X x x x x x x All tests acceptable after rawbxk
Reworked
11 0014 x X x x x x x No test anosralien
12 0015 x x x x x x x No test anomalies
13 0017 x x x x x 0 Failed to actuate properly at
249 vac 9 +165°F
14 0018 x x x x x x x He test anomalies
15 0019 x x x x X 0 No voltage indication duo to broken
wire but unit actuated properly
Unit x x x x x x x All teats acceptable after rawcrk
Reworked
16 0020 x x x x x 0 " Failed to actuate properly at
24 vda a 2650F
Unit x x x x x x x All tests acceptable aftor re ork
Reworked
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(1) units 1 (SN 0007) and 2 (SN OOlS) s.•nr® inactive (inert) devices ahippad tb - lSp`G after".
teats completed.
p Xx Indicates test passed
"O° Indicates rest failed - see ramarkee
Indicates test noterformed due to failure at 	 test E	 "t,1
Reference paragrapu per mrC Specification IOA00465
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5.0
	
QUALIFICATION TESTS
5.1	 TEST SUMMARY
Fourteen (14) S&A devices, Type 1, Series C configuration were
subjected to the test program shown on Table 111. TMc/S laboratory
report number 4918-245 included as Section 11 of Volume 1 of
this report contains the detailed test data sheets.
Two irregularities which occurred during t 	
^L
he dynamic testing
rn
f , t'..-
will be discussed in detail. One was an apparent switch failure
during ordnance shock on specimen number 14 and the other was
an electrical cycling malfunction on specimen number 2 after
vibration. These two units were investigated, interim correct-
ions were made, and the units returned to the lot. All units
I'	 were fired successfully completing qualification.
5.2	 TEST SEQUENCE AND RESULTS
(a) . Non-Destructive Acceptance (14 units) 	 This was the
lot acceptance testing discussed in paragraph 4.2 of
this report.
(b) Thermal Shock (14 units) Devices were exposed alter-
nately to four hour cycles of +165 0 P  and -700P for
a total of four high temperature exposures and three
low temperature exposures. No post environment oper-
ational tests were performed. Visual, examination revealed
no apparent damage or deterioration.
(c) Salt Fag (14 units) - The units were exposed to salt
fog at 95°F for 48 hours. No post environment operational
tests were performed. Visual examination revealed
no apparent damage or deterioration.
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1 0005 X X X X X-	 --- X X X X X - - -
rotom ovartravel
2 0006 X X X X 0	 -	 -	 - - - " X X X - - - at 32 Vdc afterlrandcat vibration
3 0008 X X X X X----- x X X x X
4 0009 X X X X X----- X X X X - X - -•
5 0010 X X X X x-	 - X X X X X
6 0011 X X X X X- X X X X - X
9 0012 X X X X X---- X X X X- X
8 0013 X X X X X X X X X - X
9 0014 x X X x - X- X X X x - - - X
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11 0017 X X X X X X	 x x X X X X - - x -
12 0018 X x X X '	 u	 x x X x X x X -
13 0019 X X X X X X	 X X X K X X X X X - - -
ouch
14 0020 X x X X X	 0 a • w X X x
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duringtion^d durissq
npnca shock
"X" Indicates test perfo=sd and passed
"0" Indicates teat failure/irregularity - refer to text
"•" Indicates test not perfommti dun to failure an pzevioua tout
Rcceptance tasting as described in 4.2 of this report
P-lec 'erical checkout was performed after this snvisant+sout •.
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5.2	 TEST SEQUENCE AND RESULTS (Continued)
(d) Sinusoidal Vibrat on
of one sine sweep in
3.0 octaves per mina
tion. Frequency and
5-10 HZ
10 - 40 Hz
(14 units) - The test consisted
each of three axis at a rate of
te, with devices in the QED posi-
test levels were:
± 1.0 g
+ 1.7 g
During vibration rotor position was monitored to verify
the rotors of the devices aid not rotate more than
7.50
 from the zero position using an indicator lamp
monitoring module connected through the input connector
to the monitor switch circuits. The units were cycled
from ARM to SAFE to ARM and back to SAFE after this
test. There was no indication of autorotation during
vibration and the units operated properly after the
test.
(e) Random vibration (14 units) - Each device was subjected
to th3r,:e random vibration spectrums representing lift-
off, boost, and re-entry phases of a typical flight.
The lift-off and boost spectrums were applied with
the devices in the ARMED position and the re-entry
spectrum applied in the SAFE position. All fourteen
units were vibrated for a time duration defined as
mission 1. specimens 11-14 were further vibrated through
all three spectrums for an additional duration defined
as missions 2-6 and specimens 13-14 vibrated still
again for a duration defined as missions 7-10. The
complete vibration schedule was as shown on Table II
of MSFC Specification 1OA00465.
-14-
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5.	 TEST S)aQUNCR AND RESULTS (Continued)
SaA rotor positions wore monitored during the test
using the indicator lamp module. There was no inch,,
oat,ion cat rotor autorotation on any of the units.
Thirteen (13) of fourteen (14) units met all test. require-
ments. However during post vibration eleotribal checkout
specimen number 2 failed to operate properly as men-
tioned in the summary of paragraph 5.1. The analysis,
cause, and corrective action .relative to this unit
is discussed in paragraph 5.4.1 of this report.
( ) Shock (6 units) •- The devices were subjected to three
shock programs% (1) Ordnance Shock, (2) SRS water:
handling, and (3) SRB Parachute Deployment. Specimens
9-14 were subjected to two impacts (one in each direa-
tion) in each of three axis which is defined as mission
I duration. The complete program was repeated on speci-
mens 11--14 with 10 impacts per axis (mission 2-6) and
kepeated again can specimen 13 for an additional 8 impacts
per axis (mission 7-10) . All testing was performed
with the device in the SAFE position. Rotor position
was monitored as in vibration testing. The complete
program was in accordance with Table 1V of MSFO Speci-
fication 10A00465.
Testing was completed on specimens 9-13 without incident.
However specimen number 14 tailed to operate (rotate
from SAFE to AMI position) after the first ordnance
shock impacts were applied. Analysis. cause, and correc-
tive action relative to this unit will be discussed
in paragraph 5.4.2 of this report.
r
At the conclusion of the exposure period the units
were visually examined. There was no evidence or corro-
sion, peeling, chipping or blistering.
(h) Leak Test (12 units) - The S&A devices ( Less specimen
numbers 2 and 14) were subjected to a water emmersion
type Leakage test at a pressure of 1 psia ( 61,000 feet)
for two minutes. There was no indication of leakage.
(Z)	 Electrical Checkout (14 units) - The S&A devices were
subjected to ambient temperature electrical checkout
consisting of: (1)	 ninety	 (90) degree rotation at
24,	 28, and 32 Vdc,	 (2) contact voltage drop, 	 {3}
and COMMA14D switch position checks,	 ( 4) solenoid resistance
measurement, (5)	 insulation resistance, and (6) contin-
uity checks. All devices met the test requirements.
(j) Temperature Electrical Cycle (14 units) - The devices
Were cycled at 24, 28, and 32 Vdc at +200
 F and +1650
F. All units cycled properly.
m
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5" 2:	 TEST SEQUENCE AND RESULTS (Continued)
(k)	 Function.: (14 'units). -The S&A devices were fired at w
all four combinations of high and low temperature in
the SAFE and ARMED positions. The conditions and speci-
mens tested were- a
_ r....
Test Temperature Position No. Units	 Specimen Numbers a
Low Temperature ,ARMED 5 units	 11	 2, 3,	 13, 14
Low Temperature SAFE 2 units	 4, 5
High Temperature ARMED 5 units	 6,	 7, 8, 11,	 12
5High Temperature SAFE 2 units	 9, 10
NS1 detonators and CDF lines with aluminum tubing witness
sleeves were installed for these tests. Debris Retainers
MSFC PN 1OA00487 were installed on the units fired
in the SAFE position. Detonators were fired siaqultan-
eously using a pair of PIC Ground Ordnance Firing Assembly
17A10436. NS1 detonators and CDF lines were installed
and torqued in place. These assemblies were conditioned
at +200 F or x-165 OF
 for one hour. After conditioning
fi.'bey were removed to the test bay and fired.
All units functioned properly. On the ARMED position
firings the detonation transferred across the explosive
lead to the CDF line and CDF explosive cores detonated
high order causing complete fragmentation of the witness
tubes.
For the SAFE position firings detonation did not propa-
gate to the CDF lines and there was no chemical, decomposi-
tion of the CDF explosive core. Also there was no
fragmentation
Photographs taken of the various results are grouped
as appendix A of this report.
The photographs and results are;
#1 Typical S&A firing setup shown immediately
after firing
#2 Specimens from Low Temp-Armed Function
#3 Specimens from High Temp-Armed Function
#4 Specimens from Low Temp-Safe Function
#5 Specimens from High Temp-Safe Function
#6 Specimens #1 and #2
0 Specimens #3 and #4
#S Specimens #5 and #6
#9 Specimens #7 and #a
#10 Specimens #9 and #10
#11 Specimens #11 and #12
#12 Specimens #13 and #14
#13 Debris:Shields from specimens #4r #5, #9
#14 Punctured debris shield and fragment from
specimen #10
#19 & 22	 CDF end tips from SAFE firing units
#19 - SN 4
#20 - SN 5
#21 - SN 9
#22-SN10
-1s-
)is
b.y`MSFC' T. These PIC°s"were actuated using a control panel construct-
ed by TMC/S in accordance with figures 1 and 2 of pyrotechnic
t
	
	 intiation controller operation and checkout procedure MSFC 17A10230
except that the 2 8 Vdc and 5 Vdc power supplies required were
housed within the control module 'forortabilit and compactness.p	 ^'	
	l	
Firing cables were -also' fabricated by TMc/S using connectors
.	 provided by MSBC..' Photogr aph #15 shows the PIC's, control module,
and cables with a detonator resistance simulator installed on
one of the cables.
Checkout of this systemin accordance with procedure MSFC 17A10230
showed all the correct voltages and resistances and all WSI detonators
fared on command during the S&A firing tests.
	
'.	 5.4
	 TEST MALFUNCTIONS
As mentioned earlier specimen numbers 2 and 14 malfunctioned
after exposure to random vibration and ordnance shock respectively.
The nature •of the malfunction, investigative effort, causer and
corrective action are discussed herein.
5.4.1 S ecimen Number 2
5.4.1.1 Description of Malfunction
= Specimen number 2 was being subjected to ambient temperature
' electrical check out after Mission 1 random vibration.
	 The rotor
'- of the device aver-rotated. (rotated beyond 9:0) on an intermittent
-^ basis when cycled from the SAFE to the ARMED.	 position.	 The device
had cycled properly at 24 and 28 Vdc prior to malfunctioning
+	 at 32 Vdc. The circuitry checks confirmed the malfunction.
-19-
55.4.1.2	 Evaluation
a'
The housing was removed by drilling out the spring wins and break-
ing the adhesive seal. The unit was opened, examined closely,
and observed during operation. The condition was traced to an
,
	
	 improperly drilled hole in clutch PN 817183 which was elongated
(roughly oval shaped) to .081. Hole size should be .062/.065
diameter.
The spring pin pressed into this hole holds the driving clutch
to the solenoid shaft. However the oversize condition allowed
slippage between these components when the clutch arm impacted
the detent arm so that positive detent action was dot achieved.
Photograph number 16 shows this condition with the elongated
hole visible just above the decent roller.
A drop of epoxy was applied to the hole/pin and allowed to cure.
The device was then retested at 24, 28, and 32 Vdc and it operated
properly. It was operated for 40 consecutive cycles at 32 vdc
(ambient temperature) without evidence of malfunction.
Ro other deficiency was found-and no other disassembly or tear
down was performed. The housing was refitted to the body and 	 ';=
temporarily sealed using fabric backed tape. Because the hermetic
	
{ .
seal and the dry
,
 gas atmosphere within the unit had been dis-	 }
turbed temperature-humidity and leakage tests were not performed.
Testing was resumed on this unit starting at electrical checkout.
Temperature electrical cycle and low temperature function ARMED
were subsequently performed and the unit functioned normally.
-20-
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5 41.3 C' ' cl.udion and' Corr.ec.tive Action
Consideration of S&A operation indicates':. the malfunction occurred
Only at higher operating voltages which produce more rapid rotor
tction (typical ly 30 millisecorcis at 32 Vdc versus 50 milli-
seconds at 24 Vdc) and therefore require more' `positive detent
action.
Corrective action to prevent recurrance of this failure mode
will be too
1. Examine, repair, and if necessary replace the drI.11
fixture used to match drill the clutch and solenoid.
Incorporate a hardened drill guide/bushing into the
fixture.
2. Revise instructions for inspection of the drilled hole
and installation of the spring pin with specific instruc-
tions to assure the same conditon does not exist prior
to proceeding with assembly.
This corrective action will become effective for the next lot
of units to be assembled.
5.4.2	 Specimen Number 14
5.4.2.1	 Description of Malfunction
During dynamic testing at Approved Engineering Test Laboratories
(AETL), specimen number 14 failed to operate after being subjected
to mission 1 ordnance shock applied in the Y axis, the first
axis to be tested. The malfunction was failure of the device
to cycle when the operating voltage was applied to the ARM command
circuit. The voltage drop circuitry tests indicated an abnormal
condition associated with the ARM COM14AND circuit which is controlled
through switch S2.
-21-
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	5.4.2.1	 Description of Malfunction
The circuitry test results with the device in the SAFE position
were:
Circuit	 Normal Reading	 Actual Reading
Pins K-N	 Less than 750 my	open circuit
Pins K-L	 Open circuit	 220 my
Therefore, values obtained were normal for a device in the ARMED
position. However, monitor circuits and visual indication showed
the device to still be in the SAFE position.
	
5.4.2.2	 Evaluation
The defective unit was returned to TMc/S for examination.	 The
..	 ,: housing was removed by drilling out the spring pins and breaking
`.`.' the adhesive seal.	 Visual examination showed switch S2 to be
in the energized (plunger depressed) position	 which was normal
for a device in the SAFE position. 	 However continuity existed
between switch terminals C and NC and an open circuit existed
between terminals C and NO.	 These readings were normal for an
Oopen (plunger released) switch but incorrect for a
	
closed (plunger
depressed) switch indicating that the switch was either damaged,
or had otherwise malfunctioned.
When the rotor was rotated manually, alternately releasing and
_ depressing the plunger, the condition corrected itself.	 Cir-
cuitry checks were repeated and all readings were normal..
	
Operating
Voltage was re-applied and the device operated normally there-
after indicating improper switching action rather than switch
damage.
;VA	 The housing was refitted to the body and sealed in place using
fabric backed tape. Because the environmental seal and dry
nitrogen atmosphere within the device had been disturbed temp-
erature--humidity and leakage tests were omitted. Testing was
resumed starting
-22-
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When the electrical tests were completed, switches Sl and S2
fr	
were removed frog; the device. The rotor was manually rotated
r	 to the ARMED position for the function test. This unit was fired
in the low temperature ARMED mode and functioned properly.
Switch S2 was opened by carefully cutting away the plastic wall
exposing the interior for examination. This switch was manufactured
by MICRO SWITCH CO. and is identified as their PN 21SX39-T,
It is listed on Qualified Products List QPL-8805-30 qualified
to MIL-S-8805/4 as PN MS24547-1. The moveable blade of this
switch is a bifurcated design jointed just outbound of the point
of contact of the plunger. Photograph number 17 shows the moveable
contact in the normal (correct) position with the plunger depressed
which duplicates the plunger position at the time the ordnance
shock impacts were applied. It was found that a very light pressure
on the outboard segment of the blade would cause it to slip at
the joint allowing it to contact the incorrect terminal. The
blade/contact would remain in this incorrect position until a
v
	
	
counter force was applied to return it to the correct position.
This condition is shown in photograph number 18.
t
During the ordnance shock test in which the malfunction occurred
switch S2 was oriented so the applied shock was in the same plane
and in--line with blade movement. This would be the most vulnerable
switch position in terms of "auto--displacement" of the blade.
No contamination by foreign material, evidence of wear, or damage
was found. Therefore the preliminary conclusion was that the
ordnance shock pulses which reached a peak of 3,500 g's caused
the outboard segment of the blade to move into and remain in
the incorrect position until subsequent actuation caused it to
return to the correct position.
-23--
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504.202	 Evaluation (Continued)
Investigation of the failure continued with examination of another
switch of the same MS24547-1 part number, manufactured by CUTLER-
HAMMER INC. The CUTLER-HAMMER switch' uses a one piece blade
which appeared to be less susceptible to the apparent failure
anode. A pair of these switches with actuators were installed
on an S&A body and the switch adjustment procedure was followed.
The .game characteristic switching action was obtained for these
switches as was-observed in the MICRO SWITCH unit, that is the
switch could be made to snap over and remain in either position
against the depressed plunger at a finite position in the differ-
ential travel zone Further examination and manipulation revealed
that the condition created is not a switch malfunction but results
when the plunger is depressed just beyond the pretravel (snapover)
range but is not sufficiently depressed into the overtravel.range.
That is, the switch is not fully actuated. The switch adjustment
technique used on the qualification lot was to position the switches
using monitor lights that indicate immediately when snap action
occurs. No provison was made to assure that the snitch plungers
were fully depressed and in fact initial plunger deflection (slack
or pretravel taken up) was avoided.
The same action of borderline actuation versus full actuation
was observed on the switch removed from the failed unit but the
dependence on adjustment was not confirmed until adjustment of
the CUTLER-HAMMER switches was performed.
-24-
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5.4.2.3	 Conclusion
our conclusion is that in specimen number 14 switch S2 was not
properly assembled and adjusted but rather that borderline actuation
was obtained. Under normal handling, checkout, and even under
	
L^	 lower level dynamic testing the switch actuated pro perly. However
the 3,500-g impact of the ordnance shock test was sufficient
to cause the switch to snap over.
	
0	 5.4.2.4	 Corrective Action
F
	
	 We recommend that MICRO SWITCH part number 21SX39-T qualified
in the S&A device be retained as the qualified part and that
recurrance of the observed failure mode will be prevented by
aa specific, positive adjustment of the switches during the assembly
operation. Full actuation of the switch plunger can be readily
f =-	 observed visually and verified electrically and will be made
.	 x.
a part of our manufacturing instructions.
No additional component testing is necessary since visual and
electrical verification of switch adjustments can be performed
on each device at any time prior to installing and sealing the
housing to the body.
5.4.3
	
Summary
Two test malfunctions were experienced during qualification testing.
	
}	 The'first, an electrical cycle malfunction, was traced to an
improper manufacturing operation, a condition which will be pre-
vented by more careful assembly and examination.
The second condition, a switch malfunction, resulted from im-
proper assembly and adjustment. This condition will also be
prevented from reoccurring by refined adjustment and examination.
Neither condition resulted from a design or material deficiency.
r
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5.5	 PROGRAM SYNOPSIS AND CONFIGURATION
5.5.1	 Program Synopsis
The overall program was completed with a minimum of problems
particularly in view of the complexity of the S&A device. No
u	
significant design problems were encountered during development.
lJ	 Tests of the most cirtical design parameters and test environ-
ments did not reveal any basis design problems. Deficiencies
L`	 which.occured required only dimensional corrections and refined
assembly processes/instructions to correct. These corrections
were incorporated into the build-up of qualification devices.
Fabrication and lot acceptance testing showed that a greater
margin for operating voltage was required in order to meet
performance limits at temperature extremes. Readjustment of
solenoid/springs and more deligent adjustment and.alignment
of he drive components corrected operating deficiencies which
occured during nigh temperature cycling tests.
Two qualification test malfunctions were experienced. However
they were not the result of design deficiencies and are not
sensitive to the multiple mission environments but resulted
from improper assembly and adjustment. The critical performance
and functioning requirements were totally successful. All ARMED
function test firings caused high order detonation of the CDF
lines as required. All SAFE function tests were successful
with no decomposition of the CDF test lead and no fragmentation
of S&A rotor or body.
Therefore, we believe that Safety and Arming Device MSFC 10A00465,
TMc/S PN 816780 has successfully passed the complete qualifica-
tion test program and is qualified for ten missions of flight
on Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster.
MR
al
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5,5.2	 Configuration
The following Indentured Data List (IDL) and drawing tabulation
represents the qulaified configuration.
IDL	 816780 L 817183 A 817190B
DWG	 816780 E 817175 C 817186 B
817170 NC 817189 A 817173 NC
817171 C+VCO 13815 817181 B 817187 NC
817166 NC 817177 A 817330 NC
817174 A 817169 NC 817179 NC
817334 B 817184 A 817178 NC
817185 NC 817180 B 817172 B
817216 NC 817182 C 817367 NC
817191 A 817168 NC 817188 A
81.7331 B
-27-
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